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Recently, Chau [Phys. Rev. A 92, 062324 (2015)] introduced an experimentally feasible qudit-based quantum-
key-distribution (QKD) scheme. In that scheme, one bit of information is phase encoded in the prepared state in
a 2n-dimensional Hilbert space in the form (|i〉 ± |j〉)/√2 with n  2. For each qudit prepared and measured in
the same two-dimensional Hilbert subspace, one bit of raw secret key is obtained in the absence of transmission
error. Here we show that by modifying the basis announcement procedure, the same experimental setup can
generate n bits of raw key for each qudit prepared and measured in the same basis in the noiseless situation. The
reason is that in addition to the phase information, each qudit also carries information on the Hilbert subspace
used. The additional (n − 1) bits of raw key comes from a clever utilization of this extra piece of information.
We prove the unconditional security of this modified protocol and compare its performance with other existing
provably secure qubit- and qudit-based protocols on market in the one-way classical communication setting.
Interestingly, we find that for the case of n = 2, the secret key rate of this modified protocol using nondegenerate
random quantum code to perform one-way entanglement distillation is equal to that of the six-state scheme.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.95.022311
I. INTRODUCTION
Prepare-and-measure-based quantum-key-distribution
(PM-QKD) protocol is a class of practical schemes in which
the sender Alice prepares a quantum state and sends it through
an insecure channel to the receiver Bob, who measures the
received state so as to establish a shared raw key. Then,
they apply classical post-processing to the raw key to distill
a secure final key [1]. While early PM-QKD protocols
such as the well-known BB84 scheme [2] use unentangled
qubits as quantum information carriers, various authors
proposed using qudits instead [1,3–8]. Generally speaking,
qudit-based schemes are more error tolerant than qubit-based
ones. However, qudit-based schemes are generally very hard
to implement in practice partly because of the difficulty
in preparing a general qudit state with high fidelity. Two
notable exceptions are the recently proposed round-robin
differential-phase-shift (RRDPS) scheme [8] and the so-called
Chau15 scheme [3].
Recall that for the Chau15 scheme, Alice randomly picks
two distinct elements i,j from the Galois field GF(2n) with n 
2 and prepares a state in the form (|i〉 ± |j 〉)/√2, where {|i〉 :
i ∈ GF(2n)} is an orthonormal basis of the 2n-dimensional
Hilbert space. After receiving this state from Alice, Bob
randomly picks two distinct elements i ′,j ′ ∈ GF(2n) and
projectively measures the state along {(|i ′〉 ± |j ′〉)/√2. The
Chau15 scheme is experimentally feasible because in the
time bin representation, the preparation and measurement
procedures are almost identical to those for diagonal basis
qubits [3]. In this regard, we call these preparation and
measurement states qubit-like. The security of the Chau15
scheme originates from the fact that for n  2, the values of
i,j,i ′,j ′ used, and hence the Hilbert subspace picked during
*hfchau@hku.hk
the preparation and measurement of these qubit-like states,
are withheld from the eavesdropper Eve until after Bob’s
measurement. Clearly, Alice and Bob should get a shared raw
bit of key encoded in the phase of the prepared qudit should
{i,j} = {i ′,j ′}. In other words, the Chau15 scheme is able to
generate one bit of raw secret key per successful transfer of
each 2n-dimensional qudit provided that it is prepared and
measured in the same Hilbert subspace [3].
Here we show that the Chau15 scheme can be modified
so that the number of raw secret bits generated per each such
successful qudit transfer can be increased from 1 to n. We do
it by replacing the announcement procedures for the Hilbert
subspaces used to the preparation and measurement bases.
In this way, the (n − 1) classical bits used to describe the
Hilbert subspace information of each prepare and measure
qubit-like qudit state, which is also withheld from Eve until
Bob’s measurement, can then be used to generate part of the
raw key. More importantly, there is no need to change the
hardware setup of the Chau15 scheme in this modification.
In Sec. II, we first introduce an entanglement-distillation-
based quantum-key-distribution (ED-QKD) protocol known
as Scheme A. Then, we use Shor-Preskill argument [1,9] to
show that Scheme A can be reduced to two equally secure
PM-QKD protocols known as Schemes B and C. In particular,
the state preparation and measurement procedures in Scheme
C are identical to that of the Chau15 scheme. We then prove the
unconditional security of Scheme A and give key rate formulas
under one-way entanglement distillation for Schemes A–C in
Sec. III. We also compare the performance of our schemes
to various provably secure qubit- and qudit-based PM-QKD
schemes in the literature using one-way entanglement distilla-
tion in Sec. III. In particular, we find that for the case of n = 2,
the secret key rate of Scheme B is equal to that of the six-state
scheme [10] when both use nondegenerate random quantum
codes to perform one-way entanglement distillation. Finally,
we briefly discuss the experimental feasibility of Schemes B
and C.
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II. THE MODIFIED SCHEMES
A. The entanglement-distillation-based scheme
known as Scheme A
Let N ≡ 2n with n  2 and consider the following ED-
QKD scheme known as Scheme A.1 (The description below
extensively uses a lot of finite field arithmetic. Readers may
consult Ref. [11] for an introduction.)
The modified ED-QKD scheme (Scheme A).
(1) Alice secretly and randomly picks [a] ∈ GF(N )/GF(2)
and λ ∈ GF(N )∗ ≡ GF(N ) \ {0}. She prepares the state∑
¯i∈GF(2) |¯i + [a]〉A ⊗ |¯i + [a]〉B/
√
2, where all arithmetic in
the ket state are performance in the finite field GF(N ).
She applies the linear transformation Lλ|i〉 	→ |λi〉 for all
i ∈ GF(N ) to the second qudit before sending it through an
insecure quantum channel to Bob.
(2) Upon reception of the state from Alice, Bob secretly
and randomly picks λ′ ∈ GF(N ) and applies the linear trans-
formation L−1λ′ to his received state.
(3) Alice and Bob jot down the joint measurement result
along the basis,
B =
⎧⎨
⎩
1√
2
∑
¯i∈GF(2)
(−1)¯ic¯|¯i + [a]〉A ⊗ |¯i + [a] + b〉B
: [a] ∈ GF(N )/GF(2),b ∈ GF(N ), c¯ ∈ GF(2)
⎫⎬
⎭
≡ {|[a],b,c¯〉}, (1)
to their shared quantum state. Then, they publicly announce
the values of λ,λ′ used and keep the state only if λ = λ′. They
repeat steps 1–3 until they have enough shared pairs.
(4) Alice and Bob pick a random sample from their
remaining measured states and reveal the values of b and c¯
obtained for each of the selected states for various λ’s and
[a]’s to estimate the error rate of the channel. Specifically, let
e˜bc¯ be the probability that Alice prepares the state |[a],0,0〉 and
that the resultant state measured by Alice and Bob is |[a],b,c¯〉
for some [a] ∈ GF(N )/GF(2). Then, by revealing the values
of b and c¯ from a random sample of those shared states to
which Alice and Bob have applied I ⊗ Lλ and I ⊗ L−1λ , they
obtain an estimate of the value of e˜λ[b],c¯ + e˜λ([b]+1),c¯ for all
[b] ∈ GF(N )/GF(2) and c¯ ∈ GF(2). They proceed only if the
error rate is sufficiently small. (We shall discuss the smallness
criterion later on in the unconditional security proof in Sec. III.)
(5) Alice and Bob apply one- or two-way entanglement
distillation similar to the ones used in Refs. [3,7,9,12,13] to
the remaining states to distill out almost perfect EPR-like
states each in the form |[a],0,0〉. For instance, they apply
a Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) quantum error-correcting
code [14–17] that could correct the measured spin-flip and
phase errors of the channel in step 4. (Note that such a CSS code
1From now on, we use the convention that a variable in Roman,
square-bracketed, overbarred, and Greek alphabet are in GF(N ),
GF(N )/GF(2), GF(2), and GF(N )∗, respectively.
is constructed using a classical N -ary code C1 and a classical
binary code C2 obeying {0} ⊂ C2 ⊂ C1 via the standard CSS
construction. This is possible for a binary code can be regarded
as an N -ary code by extending the linear coding space over the
field GF(2) to the linear space over the field GF(N ). In fact, we
may extend the dual code of the binary code C2 to an N -ary
code with the same minimum distance using the same trick.
In this way, C1 and C2 can be used to correct spin-flip and
phase errors in this noisy and insecure channel, respectively.
More importantly, the choice of C1 could depend on the error
syndrome measurement results of the code C2 just like the one
used by Lo in Ref. [12].)
(6) Finally, Alice and Bob separately measure each of their
share of the almost perfect EPR-like states along the basis B1,
where
Bλ =
⎧⎨
⎩
1√
2
∑
¯i∈GF(2)
(−1)¯ic¯|λ(¯i + [a])〉
: [a] ∈ GF(N )/GF(2),c¯ ∈ GF(2)
⎫⎬
⎭ (2)
for all λ ∈ GF(N )∗. In this way, they obtain n bits of shared
secret key per EPR-like state measured—1 bit comes from the
phase information c¯ and (n − 1) bits come from the value of
[a] ∈ GF(N )/GF(2).
We remark that in the absence of noise and Eve, Alice and
Bob should get b = c¯ = 0 for each pair of tested quantum
particles in step 4. And in this case, they share a copy of the
EPR-like state |[a],0,0〉 per qudit transfer just after step 3.
A simple-minded way to understand the origin of security of
this scheme is that as Alice puts each shared EPR-like state
in a Hilbert subspace, which is not known to Eve, she has a
non-negligible chance of disturbing the signal if she guesses
this subspace incorrectly.
B. Reduction to two prepare-and-measure-based schemes
known as Schemes B and C
Consider the unitary operation BADD for Alice and Bob
to separately add their first qudit to their second qudit in the
computational basis. Clearly,
BADD(|[a],b,c¯〉 ⊗ |[a′],b′,c¯′ 〉)
= |[a],b,c¯−c¯′ 〉 ⊗ |[a]+[a′],b+b′,c¯′ 〉. (3)
Consider also the unitary operation that acts on the computa-
tional basis according to
H (|b〉) =
{(|b〉 + |b + 1〉)/√2 if b ∈ GF(N )/GF(2),
(−|b〉 + |b + 1〉)/√2 otherwise.
(4)
Then
H ⊗ H (|[a],b,c¯〉) = (−1) ¯b0 |[a],b+ ¯b0+c¯, ¯b0〉
= (−1) ¯b0 |[a],[b]+c¯, ¯b0〉, (5)
up to a global phase, where ¯b0 ∈ GF(2) denotes the constant
term of the degree-(n−1) polynomial expression for b in
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GF(2)[x]. Clearly, both H ⊗ H and BADD map basis states in
B to itself up to an overall phase. Since the error correction and
privacy amplification procedure using the specially designed
CSS code in step 5 of Scheme A involves H ⊗ H , BADD,
standard basis measurement plus local quantum operation by
Bob only, therefore Alice may push her final measurement
forward in time. By the Shor-Preskill argument [7,9], we obtain
an equally secure PM-QKD scheme that we called Scheme B.
To find the corresponding channel error estimation method
for this equally secure Scheme B, we consider the linear
operators [16,17]:
Xu|i〉 = |i + u〉 and Zu|i〉 = (−1)Tr(ui)|i〉, (6)
for all u ∈ GF(N ), where Tr(i) = i + i2 + i4 + · · · + iN/2 is
the absolute trace of i. Then
L−1λ XuZvLλ = Xλ−1uZλv. (7)
Recall that in Scheme A, Alice first prepares the state |[a],0,0〉.
Consider those shared states to which Alice and Bob have
applied the operations I ⊗ Lλ and I ⊗ L−1λ , respectively.
Suppose Alice and Bob separately measure these shared states
after passing through the insecure channel in the B1 basis.
Suppose further that Alice informs Bob of her measurement
outcomes. Then from Eqs. (2) and (5)–(7), Bob could deduce
[λ−1u] + Tr(λv) and hence both [λ−1u] and Tr(λv) as these
two variables are linearly independent over GF(2). Since
the solution of the equation [λ−1u] = [b] is u = λ[b] or
u = λ([b] + 1), the outcomes of the above measurement by
Alice and Bob give estimates of e˜λ[b],c¯ + e˜λ([b]+1),c¯ for all
λ ∈ GF(N )∗, [b] ∈ GF(N )/GF(2), and c¯ ∈ GF(2). Hence, our
ED-QKD Scheme A can be reduced to the following equally
secure PM-QKD Scheme B.
The modified PM-QKD scheme (Scheme B).
(1) Alice randomly picks λ ∈ GF(N )∗ and prepares one of
the basis states in Bλ by randomly selecting the parameters [a]
and c¯. He sends the state to Bob.
(2) Upon reception, Bob randomly picks λ′ ∈ GF(N )∗ and
measures his received state in the Bλ′ basis.
(3) They publicly announce the values of λ,λ′ used and
keep their state only if λ = λ′. They add the parameters ([a],c¯)
describing their prepared and measured states to their raw key
string. They repeat steps 1–3 until they have a sufficiently long
raw key.
(4) They estimate the values of e˜λ[b],c¯ + e˜λ([b]+1),c¯ by
revealing (and discarding) a random sample of dits from the
raw key to which Alice and Bob have applied I ⊗ Lλ and
I ⊗ L−1λ , respectively. They proceed only if the error rate is
sufficiently small.
(5) Alice and Bob apply classical error correction and
privacy amplification to their remaining raw keys based on the
classical N -ary code C1 and classical binary code C2 obeying
{0} ⊂ C2 ⊂ C1. Moreover, C1 may be picked depending on
the error syndrome of C2 just like the privacy amplification
procedure reported in Ref. [12]. Specifically, we denote the
(N/2)-ary vector formed by the [a]’s and the binary vector
formed by the c¯’s in Alice’s remaining raw key by a and c,
respectively. Alice announces the error syndromes for C1 of
a and C2 of c. Bob subtracts them from his corresponding
measured error syndromes and then uses the subtracted results
to perform classical error corrections using codes C1 (C2) on
his remaining raw key a′ (c′). For a sufficiently low noise
level, the Bob’s raw key after error correction should agree
with Alice’s. They now use the cosets a + C1 and c + C2 as
their shared final key.
Note that Scheme B is analogous to the Chau15 scheme in
Ref. [3]. The most notable difference is that unlike the Chau15
scheme, the two-dimensional Hilbert subspaces used in state
preparation and measurement are not revealed in Scheme B.
Since each element in Bλ can be rewritten in the form
(|i〉 ± |j 〉)/√2 for some i = j ∈ GF(N ), the state preparation
of Scheme B in step 1 is exactly the same as that of the
Chau15. While the state measurement procedure of Scheme
B in step 2 is a complete measurement and is different from
the incomplete measurement used in the Chau15, we could
further change this step in Scheme B to step 2’ below so that
the hardware setup is identical to that of the Chau15 scheme.
We call this further modified protocol Scheme C.
The further modified PM-QKD scheme (Scheme C).
(2′) Upon reception, Bob randomly picks λ′ ∈ GF(N )∗,
[a′] ∈ GF(N )/GF(2) and measures his received state along
{|λ′[a′]〉 ± |λ′(1 + [a′])〉}/√2. (Clearly, this is equivalent
to randomly picking i ′ = j ′ ∈ GF(N ) and measuring the
received state along (|i ′〉 ± |j ′〉)/√2 as in the measurement
step in the Chau15 scheme.) Bob informs Alice to ignore
her parameters λ, [a], and c¯ and repeat her state preparation
and sending procedures in step 1 of Scheme B in case his
measurement fails.
Note that Schemes B and C are equally secure. The reason
is that Eve’s action on the qudits cannot depend on the
values of λ′’s and [a]’s used for she has no knowledge of
them when the qudits pass through the insecure quantum
channel. Consequently, the error rates e˜bc¯ experienced by
the |[a],0,0〉’s in the corresponding ED-QKD Scheme A
for those discarded and undiscarded qudits are the same.
In summary, this further modification in Scheme C allows
easier experimental implementation than Scheme B because
complete measurement in the Bλ′ basis even for N = 4 is not
trivial. However, the key rate of Scheme C will be lower than
that of Scheme B since more signals have to be discarded in
step 2’. We shall get back to this point in Sec. III B below.
Finally, we remark that it is possible to apply two-way
error correction and privacy amplification in Schemes A–C
similar to the one used in the Chau15 scheme [3]. In fact, the
conclusions on the error-tolerable capability of the Chau15
scheme using two-way entanglement purification in Ref. [3]
is directly applicable to our three schemes. In what follows,
however, we focus on the performance of Schemes A–C
using the more practical one-way entanglement purification
procedure [9], which gives a higher key rate when the channel
noise is low at the expense of having a lower error-tolerable
rate.
III. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. The unconditional security proof Of Scheme A
Recall that in Scheme A, Eve sees the same completely
mixed density matrix for the quantum state that Alice
sends to Bob in step 1 irrespective of the value of λ
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used. So the quantum operation ρ 	→ E(ρ) =∑i KiρK†i Eve
applies to the insecure quantum channel is independent of
λ, where each Kraus operator used can be written as Ki =∑
u,v∈GF(N) giuvXuZv for some giuv ∈ C. Since
∑
i K
†
i Ki = I
and ZvXu = (−1)Tr(uv)XuZv [7,17], we have
∑
i,u,v |giuv|2 = 1
and
∑
i,u,v g
∗
iuvgi,u,v+w = 0 for all w = 0. Consequently,
e˜b,c¯ = 〈[a],b,c¯|E(|[a],0,0〉〈[a],0,0|)|[a],b,c¯〉
=
∑
i
′∑
v,v′
g∗ibvgibv′ =
∑
i
′∑
v
|gibv|2 ≡
′∑
v
ebv, (8)
where the primed sum is over those variables v and/or
v′ ∈ GF(N ) satisfying Tr(v) = Tr(v′) = c¯. Note that I ⊗
XuZv|[a],b,c¯〉 = I ⊗ Xu′Zv′ |[a],b,c¯〉 up to an irrelevant phase
whenever u = u′ and Tr(v) = Tr(v′). Combined with Eq. (8),
we conclude that Eve’s attack through E is equivalent to the
quantum operation ρ 	→∑u,v euvXuZvρ(XuZv)†. In this regard,
we may interpret euv as the probability that the qudit has
experienced XuZv in the insecure quantum channel.
Recall that we obtain estimates of e˜λ[b],c¯ + e˜λ([b]+1),c¯ for
[b] ∈ GF(N )/GF(2), λ ∈ GF(N )∗, and c¯ ∈ GF(2) in step 4 of
Scheme A. In the infinite key length limit, these estimates
are exact. More importantly, euv’s must be consistent with
these estimates through Eq. (8). The dimension of each qudit
received by Bob is N = 2n. So quantum Gilbert-Varshamov
bound [14,15] tells us that the CSS code needed to perform the
entanglement distillation in step 5 of Scheme A exists provided
that [12]
K = n − max h2({euv}u,v∈GF(N))
≡ n + max
∑
u,v∈GF(N)
euv log2 euv > 0, (9)
where the maximum is over all euv’s in [0,1] that are consistent
with the error rate estimates, namely, e˜λ[b],c¯ + e˜λ([b]+1),c¯ for
[b] ∈ GF(N )/GF(2), λ ∈ GF(N )∗ and c¯ ∈ GF(2). Once this
(random) CSS code exists, Alice and Bob can almost surely
distill out almost perfect states each in the form |[a],0,0〉.
There are a few ways to define the key rate for a QKD
protocol. Here we extend the one used for qubit transfer in
Ref. [1], which is experimentally meaningful, to qudit transfer
by defining the secret key rate as the number of provably secure
dits distilled divided by the number of qudit transferred in the
limit of an arbitrary large number of qudit transfer. In the case
of a lossless channel and perfect detectors, the secret key rates
for Scheme A and hence also Scheme B equal
RA = RB = max(0,K/{n(N − 1)}). (10a)
Note that in the above expression, the 1/(N − 1) factor is the
probability that Alice’s λ agrees with Bob’s λ′; and the 1/n
factor converts the number of secret bits to dits. To summarize,
both Schemes A and B can distill out a secret key provided that
Eq. (9) holds for all euv’s given that they obey the constraints
coming from the measurement statistics in step 4 of Scheme
A. Clearly, the resultant secret key is composable [18,19]. This
completes our proof of the unconditional security.
Finally, we remark that for Scheme C, Alice and Bob will
add n bits to their raw keys if λ = λ′ and Bob’s measurement
in step 2’ is successful. As a result, the secret key rate for
Scheme C equals
RC = 2RB/N = max(0,2K/{nN (N − 1)}). (10b)
Here, the extra factor of 2/N is the probability of having a
successful measurement in step 2’.
B. Key rate formulas for Schemes A–C
One may study the performance of Schemes A–C using all
the parameters obtained from step 4 to constrain euv’s. But this
approach is not very fruitful. Since the secret key comes from
both [a] and c¯, it makes sense to gauge the performance of our
QKD scheme by one of the following two sets of parameters.
The first set is the average bit error rate ec¯ of the c¯’s and the
average dit error rate e[a] of the [a]’s in the raw key. (Note that
both ec¯ and e[a] are averaged over λ.) The second set is simply
the bit error rate of the raw bit key string eraw.
Note that permuting the nonzero u and v indices in euv’s
does not change the values ec¯, e[a], and eraw. Combined with the
convexity of h2, we conclude that the maximum in the right-
hand side of Eq. (9) is reached only if eμ0 = eμ′0, e0ν = e0ν ′ ,
and eμν = eμ′ν ′ for all μ,μ′,ν,ν ′ ∈ GF(N )∗. This observation
greatly simplifies the computation of K in Eq. (9) as it becomes
the easily manageable optimization problem involving four un-
knowns, namely, A ≡ e00, B ≡
∑
ν∈GF(N)∗ e0ν/(N − 1), C ≡∑
μ∈GF(N)∗ eμ0/(N − 1), and D ≡
∑
μ,ν∈GF(N)∗ eμν/(N − 1)2
under the constraints,
0  A,B,C,D  1, (11a)
1 = A + (N − 1)(B + C) + (N − 1)2D, (11b)
ec¯ = N2 {B + (N − 1)D}, (11c)
e[a] = (N − 1){C + (N − 1)D}, (11d)
for the case of finding RB(ec¯,e[a]). And by putting in the
additional constraint,
eraw = 1
n
{
ec¯ + (n − 1)Ne[a](N − 1)(N − 2)
}
, (11e)
one could determine RB(eraw). Note that the first term in the
curly bracket in the right-hand side of Eq. (11e) comes from
the fact that 1/n of the raw bits originates from the values
of c¯’s. For the second term,
∑
v∈GF(N) eμv = e[a]/(N − 1)
for all μ ∈ GF(N )∗ so that each type of dit error in [a]
occurs at a rate of 2e[a]/(N − 1). Converting the dit [a]
to (n − 1) bits, the corresponding bit error rate becomes
2e[a]/(N − 1) × (N/4)/(N/2 − 1). Hence, the second term in
Eq. (11e) corresponds to the contribution of bit error rate in
the value of [a].
Figure 1 plots the secret key rate RB of Scheme B for N = 4
using one-way classical communication for fixed ec¯ and e[a]
by numerically optimizing Eqs. (9) and (10a) subject to the
constraints in Eqs. (11a)–(11d). It shows that the maximum
tolerable error rate ec¯ (e[a]) can be very high when e[a] (ec¯) is
low. So, when e[a] is small, Alice and Bob may drop all the raw
bits originated from [a]’s and use only the raw bits originated
from c¯’s to distill the secret key similar to the method used
in Ref. [3]. In this way, the maximum tolerable ec¯ can be as
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FIG. 1. The secret key rate RB of Scheme B as a function of e[a]
and ec¯ for N = 4 using one-way entanglement distillation.
large as 1/2 at the expense of having a very low secret key
rate. Similar conclusion is drawn when ec¯ is small as Alice
and Bob may keep only those raw bits generated from the
measurement of [a]’s. However, we shall not pursue further
along this direction here.
C. Comparison with other provably secure PM-QKD schemes
We now compare the performance of Scheme B with a
few well-known qubit- and qudit-based PM-QKD schemes.
And we focus our comparison for the case when the quantum
channel is lossless and that the detectors are prefect without
dark counts and dead time in the limit of an infinitely
long raw key. (We shall briefly discuss photon insertion
loss in the experimental apparatus toward the end of this
subsection.) In addition, we only consider the case of one-way
privacy amplification. For qubit-based schemes, we choose
the BB84 [2] and the six-state schemes [10]. Note that for
qudit-based PM-QKD schemes, unconditional security proofs
are known only for a few of them. The representative examples
are the Chau05 scheme [7] and the RRDPS scheme [8]. That
is why we choose these two in our comparison.
Figure 2 depicts the secret key rates R for various PM-
QKD schemes using one-way entanglement distillation with
nondegenerate quantum code as a function of eraw. And Table I
summarizes the values of R when eraw = 0 as well as the
maximum provably secure bit error rate of the raw key for these
schemes. For the cases of N = 4 and 8 in Scheme B, the secret
key rates are computed by a similar numerical optimization
procedure used to obtain Fig. 1. (For Scheme C in both cases,
the rate is one-half of that for Scheme B.) It shows that the
maximum provably secure bit error rate eraw decreases as N
increases.
The most eye-catching feature in Fig. 2 is that the secret
key rates of the six-state scheme [10] and Scheme B for N = 4
seem to agree. (That is to say, for N = 4, Scheme B and hence
FIG. 2. The secret key rates R as a function of the bit error rate of
the raw bit string eraw for various PM-QKD schemes in the one-way
communication setting. Scheme B, BB84, Chau05, and RRDPS are
shown in solid, dot, dash-dot, and dash curves, respectively. Note
that the six-state scheme here uses nondegenerate quantum code for
entanglement distillation.
Scheme C can tolerate up to 12.6% bit error rate [12].) Here
we prove that it is indeed the case.
First, there is a unique property for N = 4, namely, that
the bit error rate of the raw key eraw in Eq. (11e) is unaltered
by swapping eμ0 with e0μ for all μ ∈ GF(N )∗ although this
swapping may change the values of ec¯ and e[a]. By convexity
of h2, the value of K in Eq. (9) is minimized only if
B = C. Thus, Eq. (9) can be written as an extremization
over a single variable D after eliminating A and B via the
constraints given by Eqs. (11b)–(11e). By finding the turning
point of the resultant expression as a function of D, we
conclude that K is minimized when D = e2raw/4 [and hence
B = C = eraw/2 − 3e2raw/4 = (eraw/2)(1 − 3eraw/2) and A =
1 − 3eraw + 9e2raw/4 = (1 − 3eraw/2)2]. Upon simplification,
TABLE I. Performance of various PM-QKD schemes using
one-way entanglement distillation. Here, the emaxraw for the six-state
scheme is for the case of using degenerate quantum code to perform
entanglement distillation.
Scheme N a R(0)b emaxraw c
BB84 [2,9] 2 1/2 11.0%
Six-state [10,12] 2 1/3 12.7%
Chau05 [7] 4 1/15 5.1%
8 1/63 2.5%
RRDPS [8] 4 0.041 1.0%
8 0.136 8.2%
Scheme B 4 1/3 12.6%
8 1/7 7.5%
Scheme C 4 1/6 12.6%
8 1/28 7.5%
aThe Hilbert space dimension of the quantum information carrier.
bThe secret key rate in the noiseless and lossless situation.
cThe maximum provably secure bit error rate of the raw key.
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we have
K = 2 + A log2 A + 3B log2 B + 3C log2 C + 9D log2 D
= 2
{
1 +
(
1 − 3eraw
2
)
log2
(
1 − 3eraw
2
)
+ 3eraw
2
log2
(eraw
2
)}
. (12)
From Eq. (10a), we conclude that the secret key rate of Scheme
B as a function of eraw is the same as that of the six-state scheme
by one-way entanglement distillation using nondegenerate
codes [12]. We do not believe that this is coincidental for
these two very different schemes to have the same secret key
rate. But we have no idea why.
The most error-tolerant PM-QKD scheme using N -
dimensional qudits is the Chau05 scheme, which can tolerate
up to eraw = 35.6% using two-way classical communication
for N = 4 [7]. To find the maximum tolerable error rate using
one-way communication for the Chau05 scheme, we use the
fact that the scheme effectively depolarizes the quantum error
so that euv = eu′v′ for all (u,v),(u′,v′) = (0,0). Hence, Eq. (9)
becomes
K = n + e00 log2 e00 + (1 − e00) log2
(
1 − e00
N2 − 1
)
. (13)
WhenN = 4,K = 0 at e00 = 0.710. Thus, the Chau05 scheme
using one-way entanglement distillation can tolerate up to (1 −
e00)N/(N2 − 1) × (N/2)/(N − 1) = 5.1% bit error rate for
N = 4. By the same analysis, the Chau05 scheme using one-
way entanglement distillation can tolerate up to 2.5% bit error
rate.
For the RRDPS scheme using N -dimensional qudits with
one-way privacy amplification, the secret key rate is given
by [8]
RRRDPS = 1log2 N
{
1 − h2
(
1
N − 1
)
− h2(eraw)
}
, (14)
where h2(e) = −e log2 e − (1 − e) log2(1 − e). (Note that the
extra 1/ log2 N factor, which does not appear in Ref. [8],
converts the number of bits to the number of dits in the raw
key.) That is to say, it can tolerate up to a bit error rate of 1.0%
and 8.2% for N = 4 and 8, respectively.
These findings are summarized in Fig. 2 and Table I. They
show that, for both N = 4 and 8, the error-tolerant capability
of Schemes B and C using one-way classical communication
is better than the Chau05 [7] and the RRDPS [8] schemes.
Table I also shows the secret key rate in the noiseless situation.
In this situation, and for N = 4, the secret key rate of Scheme
B is the same as that of the six-state scheme and is much higher
than those of the Chau05 [7] and the RRDPS [8] schemes but
lower than the BB84 [2]. All in all, we conclude that in terms
of the secret key rate in the noiseless limit and the maximum
tolerable provably secure bit error rate of the raw key using
one-way entanglement distillation, both Schemes B and C can
be ranked among the best all-rounded PM-QKD schemes for
N = 4. Therefore, from Fig. 2, when restricted to one-way
entanglement distillation, the most economical way for Alice
and Bob to share their secret key is to use the BB84 in case the
channel noise is low (when eraw  9%) and either the six-state
scheme or Scheme B with N = 4 if the channel noise is high
(when 9%  eraw  12%) provided that errors and losses in
the labs of Alice and Bob are negligibly small.
For actual experimental setup, we have already pointed
out that the state preparation of Schemes B and C is the
same as that of the Chau15 scheme in Ref. [3]. For Scheme
B, the measurement is more complicated than in Ref. [3]
for the present scheme requires complete measurement. The
measurement can either be done by active or passive basis
selection; the latter case can be done by adapting the method
used by Muller et al. in Ref. [20] using (N − 1)N photon
detectors, which is barely feasible though not very economical
for N = 4 due to the large number of detectors required.
Whereas for Scheme C, the measurement can be done in
exactly the same way as in the Chau15 scheme [3], which
can be directly adapted from the measurement part of various
RRDPS experiments [21–23]. It is instructive to carry out
actual experiments using Schemes B and C and compare their
performances with that of the six-state scheme, and we are
going to do so.
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